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Abstract
We know from observation that some democracies intervene deeply in their domestic economies
while others adopt a more laissez faire approach. Can we explain these differences solely with
ideology, or are other political influences also at work? I argue in this paper that elected leaders
sometimes opt for hefty economic regulation purely to generate sources of patronage that can be
used to maintain their political positions. Leaders are most tempted to take this approach, I con-
tend, when their political parties are not stably linked to sources of electoral support. Unstably
linked governing parties will tend to have very short time horizons, focusing on the immediate ob-
jective of avoiding massive vote losses in the next election. As a result, they will be less concerned
with the potential future damage that a patronage-based policy may inflict on the national econ-
omy. I find support for this argument with a close examination of Indian economic policy under
Indira Gandhi. Prime Minister Gandhi, I contend, increased the Indian state’s control over trade,
industrial production, and credit allocation just as the Congress Party’s linkages to the electorate
were destabilizing.
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 We know from observation that some democracies intervene deeply in their 
domestic economies while others adopt a more laissez faire approach.  Can we 
explain these differences solely with ideology, or are other political influences 
also at work?  I argue in this paper that elected leaders sometimes opt for hefty 
economic regulation purely to generate sources of patronage that can be used to 
maintain their political positions.  Leaders are most tempted to take this approach, 
I contend, when their political parties are not stably linked to sources of electoral 
support. 
By far the most frequent explanation for relative government involvement 
in economic affairs is political ideology.1  Leftist leaders are said to be more 
likely than their rightist counterparts to intervene in the economy, driven by 
suspicion of the free market’s ability to advance social justice.  By contrast, 
rightist, and especially liberal, governments are understood to prefer a more 
laissez faire approach that is consonant with their understanding of individual 
initiative and the efficiency of free enterprise.   
While ideology undoubtedly plays an important role in the proclivity of 
governments to take on an expansive economic role, it is unlikely to be the sole 
determinant of this important policy choice.  Indeed, an increasing number of 
studies have attributed variation in state economic intervention to the nature of a 
country’s political institutions.  They have highlighted the role played by electoral 
system, executive-legislative relations, party system, and other institutional 
factors in channeling social pressures into public policies.  Past research indicates, 
for example, that when electoral systems are proportional, executives are stronger, 
and party systems are less fragmented, political decision-makers will be better 
able to resist social pressures for patronage.2 
Scholarly studies associating party organization with economic policy, 
however, are much scarcer.  Mainwaring (1999) argues that Brazil’s low level of 
party system institutionalization has crippled its economic stabilization policy.  In 
a similar vein, McGillivray (2004), Nielson (2003), and Hallerberg and Marier 
(2004) associate party centralization with trade and fiscal policy choice in 
democracies.  Nevertheless, these studies, while shedding light on the relationship 
between parties and economic intervention, do not address the potential impact of 
party-electorate linkage characteristics. In many democracies, parties are the key 
                                                 
1 This reasonable argument can be found in both scholarly and popular analyses.  
See, for example, Volkerink and de Haan 2001. Perotti and Kontopoulos 2002, 
and Oatley 1999. 
2 Examples of this large literature include Rogowski 1987, Keech and Pak 1995, 
O’Halloran 1994, Mainwaring 1999, Haggard and Webb 1994, Mansfield and 
Busch 1995, Haggard and Kaufman 1995, and Kohli 2004. 
1
Hankla: Party Linkages and Economic Policy in India
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
 political institutions connecting voters with government, and I argue here that 
these linkages are an important determinant of a state’s role in the economy.   
In this paper, I focus on the stability of a party’s linkages to the electorate.  
Parties that enjoy stable electorate linkages can depend on reliable voting support 
across elections and are therefore unlikely to fade away.3  When electorate 
linkages are unstable, by contrast, political parties lack the secure vote bases that 
ensure them reasonable support from election to election.  Unstably linked parties 
must therefore live in constant fear of catastrophic vote losses; their long-term 
viability is by no means certain.  Linkage stability may be associated with a 
variety of factors, among the most important of which is party institutionalization.  
When a political party has a well-functioning institutional structure, with party 
representatives present in locales across a country, its electorate linkages are more 
likely to be stable.  Stable party-electorate linkages can also be associated with the 
depth of a party’s relationship to particular cleavages in society.  Parties that are 
deeply rooted in highly salient social cleavages are more likely to enjoy stable 
voting support.4 
What effect might linkage stability have on state intervention in the 
economy?  Economists have long contended that more state involvement in the 
economy will result in more opportunities for patronage.  I argue here that 
unstably linked parties will be tempted to shore up their shallow electoral support 
by providing economic patronage to influential groups.  Their leaders will tend to 
have very short time horizons, focusing on the immediate objective of avoiding 
massive vote losses in the next election.  As a result, unstably linked parties will 
be less concerned with the potential future damage that a patronage-based policy 
may inflict on their national economy.   
When electorate linkages are stable, by contrast, political parties will be 
less focused on their short-term viability and have longer time horizons, other 
things equal.  They will therefore be averse to market interventions that may 
cripple their country’s long-term economic performance.5  Stably linked parties, 
                                                 
3 For more on the concept of party linkages, see Mainwaring 1999. 
4 Scholars have tended to focus either on the institutional characteristics of parties 
(e.g. Duverger 1954; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 1999; Jin 1995; 
Panebianco 1988; Randall and Svasand 2002) or on their role in reflecting 
cleavages within society (e.g. Neumann 1956;  Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Kitschelt 
et al. 1999).  In this paper, I draw my inspiration primarily from the latter 
tradition. 
5 It should be noted that some forms of targeted economic intervention (especially 
those that help overcome market failures) may be beneficial to the economy.  See, 
for example, Waldner 1999.  Nevertheless, large scale government regulation of 
the economy is generally thought to interfere with economic growth. 
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 after all, will be more likely to survive to reap the political benefits of circumspect 
economic policies and will have less need to pay off influential groups to avoid 
electoral disaster.  They will be better able to resist the short-term political 
pressures that arise from the dislocation of economic reform, and more likely to 
survive to reap the benefits of higher growth.  
Of course, even stably linked parties will sometimes succumb to the use of 
patronage for political gain.  In a majoritarian system, for example, where two 
stably linked parties are competing for the votes of a small group of undecided 
moderates, there may be a strong incentive to use patronage.  Nevertheless, the 
greater electoral security enjoyed by stably linked parties will prevent them from 
using government largess on the same scale as would similar parties without 
stable linkages.  Parties that do not enjoy stable electoral support rely almost 
exclusively on patronage to ensure their electoral prospects and are in constant 
danger of massive vote losses.  By contrast, stably linked parties have other 
means to build support and, moreover, the long-term consequences of economic 
policy choices are more central to their thinking.  Indeed, even parties that are 
stably linked to protectionist interests will have an incentive to moderate 
potentially damaging economic intervention to preserve patronage for future use.   
To evaluate the proposed relationship between party linkage stability and 
economic policy, I present here an examination of Indira Gandhi’s India.  I argue 
that the de-institutionalization of the country’s dominant party, the Indian 
National Congress, during Indira Gandhi’s tenure as prime minister helped drive 
the Indian state’s role in the economy.6  Put simply, I suggest that Gandhi was 
forced to generate new sources of economic patronage in order to shore up her 
shallow support in the electorate.  While it is difficult to evaluate the motivations 
of political actors, I seek evidence for my contentions in the timing and nature of 
Prime Minister Gandhi’s economic initiatives.  
I make use of process tracing to evaluate the presence of causal linkages 
connecting electorate linkage instability with economic intervention.7  Process 
tracing allows me to evaluate whether party linkages did in fact motivate 
patronage distribution, and whether they did so for the reasons predicted by my 
argument.  The approach has the benefit of allowing me to test causation directly 
rather than through the lens of correlation.  In tracing the decision-making process 
in India, I pay special attention to the perceptions and behavior of decision-
makers and the sequencing of events.  I ask, for example, whether Indira Gandhi 
                                                 
6 In this paper, I variously use the terms “Congress Party,” “Congress,” and 
“Indian National Congress” to refer to the party of Nehru and Indira Gandhi. 
7 On process tracing, see Pierson and Skocpol 2002; Pierson 2004; Mahoney 
2000, Hall 2003, and King, Keohane, and Verba 1992. 
3
Hankla: Party Linkages and Economic Policy in India
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
 was responding in her economic policy to changes in the stability of her party’s 
linkages to the electorate.   
 
Party Linkage Characteristics and Economic Policy Before 1969  
 
In order to understand the political and economic changes wrought during Indira 
Gandhi’s tenure as prime minister, we must briefly discuss what came before.  
With Jawaharlal Nehru as prime minister and Congress Party president, the 1950s 
saw the heyday of the so-called Congress system.8  During the Nehru era, the 
Congress Party dominated Indian politics, winning every federal election and 
controlling almost every state.  The Congress, while contesting free elections, met 
with little effective opposition from minority parties.  Indeed, India’s democracy 
was preserved less through parliamentary elections than through the organization 
of the party itself.  The preferences of sub-national elites across the country were 
aggregated into policy within the Congress structure, and in return these local 
party bosses delivered “banks” of voter support to party candidates.  As a result, 
the Congress Party possessed great legitimacy and deep organizational roots 
across India, ensuring stable linkages to the electorate and consistent support from 
a vast electoral base.9   
 During this period, India set itself firmly on the path of import substitution 
industrialization (ISI), the strategy embodied in the country’s transformative 
Second Five Year Plan.  This development strategy called for the state-assisted 
production of key goods domestically, with the goal of promoting 
industrialization free from the rigors of foreign competition.  The role of the plan 
was to direct the country’s scarce resources to those industries targeted for 
expansion by the government.  To ensure that plan targets would receive priority, 
the Indian state took upon itself the responsibility for regulating trade, industrial 
production, and (to some extent) financing.  This significant level of state 
involvement in the economy was driven primarily by an ideological commitment 
to import substitution as a development strategy, but the patronage thus produced 
helped to grease the wheels of the decentralized Congress system.10    
                                                 
8 On the Congress system, see Kothari 1964.  See also Manor 1988, Chhibber and 
Petrocik 1990, Weiner 1967, Rudolph and Rudolph 1987, and Brass 1994. 
9 See Table 1. 
10 In another paper (Hankla Forthcoming), I argue that party decentralization can 
play a role in encouraging state economic intervention, and I believe that it did 
under Nehru.  Nevertheless, as Gandhi centralized the Congress early in her 
tenure, and as she briefly adopted a more liberal economic policy, there must have 
been another source for her eventual decision to intervene even more deeply in 
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  Despite the government’s growing role in the economy, however, Nehru 
provided Indian industry with significant room for maneuver.  In a speech to the 
Lok Sabha, India’s lower house of parliament, Nehru put his economic approach 
this way: 
 
While the public sector must obviously grow – and even now it has grown, 
both absolutely and relatively – the private sector is not something 
unimportant.  It will play an important role, though gradually and 
ultimately it will fade away.  But the public sector will control and should 
control the strategic points in our economy.  The private sector . . . will be 
given a fairly wide field subject to the limitations that we have laid 
down.11 
 
While the expansion of private enterprise was heavily regulated in many sectors 
of the economy, the Indian state did not engage in widespread nationalization.  
Moreover, private industry continued to dominate a number of economic sectors 
even as the government pursued its new strategy of import substitution.12   
 Nehru died in 1964 and was succeeded as prime minister by Lal Bahadur 
Shastri.  Shastri was a consummate conciliator, and during his tenure decisions 
were made cooperatively in the cabinet and the chief party organ, the Congress 
Working Committee (CWC).13  In economic policy, Shastri was suspicious of 
planning and began to push India gradually towards greater openness and 
liberalization, but his influence was cut short when he died in 1966.14  The vote to 
determine his successor pitted Indira Gandhi, Nehru’s youthful daughter and a 
leftist cabinet member, against the senior conservative Morarji Desai.  Convinced 
that they could easily control the relatively inexperienced Gandhi, the party’s 
bosses (the Syndicate) engineered her election as India’s third prime minister.15 
 In her early years as prime minister, Indira Gandhi generally followed in 
the footsteps of Shastri, continuing her predecessor’s economic reforms.16  Upon 
                                                                                                                                     
the economy than had her father.  I identify that source here as unstable electorate 
linkages. 
11 Nehru, “Second Five Year Plan”, a speech before the Lok Sabha, May 23, 
1956, in Government of India 1958, p. 102. 
12 Kudaisya 2003. 
13 See Frankel 1978; Kochanek 1968. 
14 For more on economic liberalization under Shastri, see Mukherji 2000 and 
Kudaisya 2002. 
15 See Frankel 1978; Kochanek 1968; Rudolph and Rudolph 1987; Rai and Pandy 
1971; Corbridge and Harriss 2000. 
16 See Frankel 1978. 
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 taking office, she was immediately confronted with a severe balance of payments 
crisis, largely the result of droughts and crop failures in 1965 and 1966 and the 
1965 war with Pakistan.17  Under pressure from the donor community, especially 
the United States and the Bretton Woods institutions, Gandhi decided to devalue 
the rupee and partially liberalize India’s tight system of import licensing and 
tariffs.18  The following year, she also partially liberalized industrial licensing.19  
By the end of the 1960s, a growing feud between Gandhi and the 
organizational bosses of the Congress led to an all-out split in the party.  At the 
same time, important changes taking place in Indian society were slowly 
undermining the stable linkages between party and local elites that had 
characterized the Congress System.  Not coincidentally, Gandhi soon decided to 
reverse the liberalizing trend in India’s economic policy, increasing the state’s 
already significant role in the Indian economy still further.20 
 
The Independent Variable: 
Unstable Linkages to the Electorate 
  
The 1969 split between Prime Minister Gandhi and the Syndicate played a key 
role in de-institutionalizing the Congress, leaving in its wake a party with very 
weak and unstable linkages to the electorate. Tension between the Syndicate and 
the prime minister had been mounting since 1966 and, by 1969, a serious 
factional struggle had developed at the apex of the party.   
To strengthen her position within the party and the electorate, Indira 
Gandhi decided to court the left-wing of the Congress, painting the Syndicate as 
right-wing conformists who had hardened their hearts to the poor.  Although 
several members of the Syndicate were in fact socialists, and although Gandhi had 
earlier introduced a liberal reform package, her strategy proved quite effective.21  
When the Congress president, Nijalingappa, criticized public sector industries for 
their inefficiency at an April 1969 party meeting, Gandhi took the opportunity to 
                                                 
17 Joshi and Little 1994, Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1975, Planning Commission 
1970. 
18 See Joshi and Little 1994, Frankel 1978, Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1975, 
Corbridge and Harriss 2000.  For a discussion of the role of foreign pressure in 
the reforms from an American economist involved in the process, see Lewis 1997. 
19 Frankel 1978. 
20 For more information on the relative amount of patronage distributed in the 
Nehru versus Indira Gandhi periods, see Sudhanshu 1986, Dagli et al. 1970, Singh 
and Bose 1986, and George 1985.  
21 Frankel 1978. 
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 burnish her socialist credentials by rebutting his main points.22  Indeed, 
developing a closer relationship with the left was a useful strategy for Indira 
Gandhi as tensions mounted with the Syndicate.23  It linked her to a power center 
within the Congress Party, and it provided her with the springboard that she 
would later use to build her image as a crusader for the poor. 
 The 1969 election of the Indian president precipitated the final split 
between Indira Gandhi and the Syndicate.  The Congress leadership, with the 
prime minister’s initial agreement, nominated for the office Sanjiva Reddy, a 
prominent member of the Syndicate with a power base in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh.  Between the nomination of Reddy and the actual election, however, 
Gandhi began to fear that the Syndicate intended Reddy to use the powers of the 
presidency to weaken or even remove her as prime minister.24  As a result, Gandhi 
threw her explicit support behind the right of presidential electors (including 
members of the national and state parliaments) to exercise a “free vote”, and her 
implicit support behind the independent candidate V. V. Giri.  Giri eventually 
emerged victorious from the presidential election, having defeated Reddy by only 
a few votes.   
 Furious over the breach in traditional party discipline that had allowed 
Giri to win, Nijalingappa and the Syndicate responded by removing two of 
Gandhi’s key supporters from the CWC.25  In response, the prime minister and 
her supporters, without the approval of the CWC, requisitioned a meeting of the 
All India Congress Committee, the party’s apex body, to consider the issue.  This 
requisitioned AICC, consisting of those party members who backed the prime 
minister, met in New Delhi and voted to remove Nijalingappa from the Congress 
presidency.  With this act, two Congress Parties were effectively created; one, 
termed the Congress (R) for “requisitioned”, supported Gandhi, and the other, 
labeled the Congress (O) for “organization”, backed the Syndicate.   
When the dust had settled, most of the party organization remained loyal 
to the Syndicate’s Congress (O).  The prime minister’s party, the Congress (R) 
and later the Congress (I), retained only a small portion of the organization, filling 
in the gaps with local organizations that appeared, at first glance, to be similar to 
those in the united party.26  Prime Minister Gandhi, however, turned the party 
organization on its head, creating a system where power was derived from 
                                                 
22 Speeches by Nijalingappa and Indira Gandhi at the 72nd Party Conference, 
April 37, 1969, in Zaidi, ed. 1984, pp. 239-242. 
23 See Mukherji 2000; Frankel 1978. 
24 Frankel 1978; Rai and Pandy 1971. 
25 The following account is based on original documents published in Zaidi, ed. 
1972.  See also Frankel 1978. 
26 Frankel 1978. 
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 personal loyalty to the prime minister rather than from local support.  Many of the 
local party branches ceased to function, and when they did meet, they failed to 
provide a link between the party and the people.27        
Deeper social changes that were sweeping India also played a role in 
destabilizing the Congress Party’s electorate linkages.  By the 1967 election, the 
stable, vertical linkages that local elites had used to mobilize their dependents 
were beginning to break down.  No longer could the Congress Party rely on local 
elites to deliver the “vote banks” necessary for stable electoral support.  As a 
result, the Congress Party suffered its weakest electoral outcome since 
independence.  Indian citizens had become increasingly aware of the power of the 
vote and were beginning to organize horizontally by their perceived class, caste, 
communal, and regional interests.28  At the same time, the national mediation of 
disparate local interests that had allowed the decentralized approach of the Nehru 
years to function had dissolved into constant factional bickering.29  As a result, 
the Congress System, with its commitment to broad-based elite aggregation and 
accommodation, had become increasingly difficult to sustain.   
In Indira Gandhi’s new Congress, local elites, who had stood atop the vast, 
decentralized patronage networks of the old Congress system, were greatly 
weakened.  Atul Kohli has compared the Congress organization in five districts in 
the late 1980s, when the party was much as Gandhi had left it, with Myron 
Weiner’s study of the same districts during the height of the Congress System.30  
He found that, in stark contrast to the situation in the early 1960s, the Congress 
organization was almost nowhere to be found.  The party of Indira Gandhi had 
lost its local organizational presence. 
Prime Minister Gandhi crafted a strategy for the 1971 elections to harness 
the social changes and to minimize the damage caused by the party’s weak 
institutional foundation.  This strategy contributed powerfully to the demise of the 
Congress System and introduced India to the use of personality politics as a 
substitute for stable electorate linkages.  Instead of relying on elite intermediaries, 
decentralized patronage networks, or a strong local organization, the prime 
minister spoke directly to voters of the need to “abolish poverty”.  Her campaign 
was based on broad populist promises to improve the lot of India’s vast 
underclass, and centered on developing a personal connection between the prime 
minister and the voters.  Where stable, vertical linkages with voters had been the 
                                                 
27 Kohli 1990. 
28 Manor 1992; Kohli 1990; Corbridge and Harriss 2000; Dhar 2003; Singh 1981; 
Kothari 1975; Frankel 1978. 
29 Chhibber 1999. 
30 Kohli 1990; Weiner 1967. 
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 keys to electoral success in the 1950s, Gandhi and her promises were all that 
mattered in 1971.31 
To encourage voters to focus on national issues and her personality, 
Gandhi decided to hold India’s national and state level polls at different times.32  
Elections to the Lok Sabha were held in 1971 and pitted Prime Minister Gandhi’s 
Congress against a coalition of the Congress (O) and two rightist parties, the 
Swatantra and the Jana Sangh.  Against Gandhi’s calls to “abolish poverty” 
(“Garibi Hatao”), her opponents, accusing the prime minister of developing a cult 
of personality, invited voters to “abolish Indira” (“Indira Hatao”).   
At the polls, Indians sent a clear message: they wished to free themselves 
of poverty more than they wished to be rid of Indira Gandhi.  The prime 
minister’s populist appeals had worked magnificently, garnering her almost 44% 
of the popular vote and a solid majority in the Lok Sabha.33  Indeed, her 
performance (for it was her performance and not that of her party) almost equaled 
the pre-1967 victories of the united Congress.  Many of the country’s most 
marginalized voters, now more aware of the power of the ballot, made an 
independent decision that Indira Gandhi had their interests at heart.   Indian 
politics had entered a new era, becoming less elitist and more fractious at the 
same time. 
There was a catch to Indira Gandhi’s stunning 1971 victory, extraordinary 
as it was.  The prime minister’s reliance on personalistic appeals meant that only 
22% of Indian voters identified with her party in 1971, as against 39% in the less 
successful 1967 election.34  This precipitous drop, accompanying as it did an 
increase in electoral support, indicated that linkages between the Congress Party 
and the electorate had destabilized.  As many citizens as ever had turned out to 
vote for the party, but they were really voting for Indira Gandhi.  As a result, their 
support was very likely shallow, and if the prime minister did anything to alienate 
them, there could be a severe price to pay.35 
Still, her party’s striking victory in 1971, followed by another triumph in 
the state elections of 1972, convinced Gandhi that there was no need to rebuild 
her shriveled party organization.  Gandhi’s populist approach was further 
reinforced by India’s stunning victory in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, which 
helped contribute to the prime minister’s mass celebrity.36  She could win without 
                                                 
31 Weiner 1989; Frankel 1978; Corbridge and Harriss 2000. 
32 Rudolph and Rudolph 1987. 
33 See Table 1; Mitra and Singh 1999. 
34 Chhibber 1999. 
35 Mitra 1994; Rudolph and Rudolph 1987; Weiner 1989; Corbridge and Harriss 
2000. 
36 Frankel 1978 
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 the stable linkages of the past, and, in any case, a party organization would create 
rival sources of power.37  The price that Gandhi paid for her reliance on populism 
and unstable linkages can be seen, however, in a comparison of the Congress 
Party’s electoral performance under Indira Gandhi and Nehru.   
 
Table 1: 
Lok Sabha Election Results for the Indian National 
Congress, 1952-98 
  % Seats % Popular 
Vote 
      
Period of Stable Linkages   
   
1952 74.4 45 
1957 75.1 47.8 
1962 73.1 44.7 
      
Coefficient of Variation  0.014 0.037 
      
Period of Unstable Linkages   
   
1967 54.4 40.8 
1971 67.9 43.7 
1977 28.4 34.5 
1980 66.7 42.7 
1984 76.6 48 
      
Coefficient of Variation  0.319 0.117 
      
Sources:  Mitra and Singh 1999, www.indian-
election.com, www.indiamap.com 
 
As Table 1 shows, the electoral support won by the party under Gandhi 
was much less stable than under her father.38  The coefficient of variation (defined 
                                                 
37 Chhibber 1999, Corbridge and Harriss 2000. 
38 I include the 1984 election in the statistics for Indira Gandhi as it was contested 
immediately following her assassination and, according to most analysts, Rajiv 
Gandhi’s firm victory was largely based on the sympathy vote for his mother. 
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 as the standard deviation divided by the mean) in the popular votes gained by the 
Congress under Nehru was only 0.037 as against a coefficient of 0.117 under 
Gandhi.  The coefficients of variation for seats won in the Lok Sabha are even 
father apart.  The electoral support garnered by Nehru’s Congress varied from 
44.7 percent in 1962 to 47.8 percent in 1957.  For Indira Gandhi’s Congress, the 
corresponding range is 34.5% in 1977 and 48% in 1984.  These data indicate that 
the voting support for Indira Gandhi’s Congress varied much more across 
elections than the voting support for Nehru’s Congress, providing evidence that 
Gandhi’s personal celebrity and status as the hero of the Indo-Pakistan War could 
not prevent the destabilization of her party’s electoral linkages. 
 
Examining the Causal Linkages: 
Did Linkage Instability Drive Patronage Creation? 
 
The destabilized electorate linkages that afflicted the Congress Party were, I 
argue, vital determinants of India’s economic policies under Indira Gandhi.  To 
strengthen the patronage networks necessary to maintain her broad but unstable 
voting coalition, the prime minister expanded trade protection and state regulation 
of the economy.  Indeed, Gandhi was unable even to contemplate serious 
economic liberalization because her party’s tenuous hold on power prevented it 
from absorbing short-run political costs.   
The unstable linkages that connected Gandhi’s Congress Party to the 
electorate meant that her support, while wide and cross-cutting, was 
fundamentally shallow.  To maintain her unstable voting coalition, Gandhi 
proceeded to dispense economic favors with an eye toward rewarding supporters, 
punishing opponents, and winning over the uncertain.39  To increase her leverage, 
Gandhi accumulated an extraordinary array of additional sources of patronage.  
For example, she created an increasingly stringent import and industrial licensing 
process and established greater state control over the financial resources used to 
create and expand protected industries.  Therefore, as my argument would 
anticipate, unstable electorate linkages led to extensive trade protection and 
government regulation under Prime Minister Gandhi.  The demise of the Congress 
System, which after all was based on extensive, if stable, patronage linkages, did 
not lead to liberalization in India, or at least not for long.  It gave way to an Indira 
system, in which populist rhetoric and shallow voter support produced high 
import barriers and extensive government intervention in the economy. 
Gandhi used her new sources of patronage to build support in the 
electorate and, frequently, to court and coerce powerful interest groups whose 
                                                 
39 For more on the relative distribution of patronage under Indira Gandhi, see 
Hankla 2006. 
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 backing could help win elections.  For example, the prime minister’s 
nationalization of India’s commercial banks, while it increased her popularity 
with India’s masses, also (ironically) helped to augment her support among 
business groups and India’s political left.  Leftists were a vital part of Indira 
Gandhi’s support base, especially before the 1971 elections, and they were very 
pleased with any step to assert government control over the economy.   
By contrast, business leaders were distressed by bank nationalization but 
had little choice but to accept it.  Gandhi’s Congress, devoid of a functioning 
party organization and obliged to campaign across a vast country with limited 
media access, depended heavily on donations for its electoral success.  Most of 
these campaign donations originated from the private sector, many as a result of 
government coercion or reciprocal promises.40  Gandhi used her control over bank 
credit and other vital economic resources to establish her influence over Indian 
businesses, to punish industrialists who had supported the Syndicate in 1969, and 
to ensure her access to financial support.41  She also distributed finance and food 
aid to state governments to influence their elections, and provided jobs, farm 
subsidies, and other economic benefits to voters to encourage their support for her 
party.42  The prime minister’s short time horizons, focused as they were on 
maintaining her party in power, led her to discount the long term impact of her 
actions on her wide support base. 
As my argument would anticipate, Indira Gandhi, after an initial 
liberalization of policy, expanded government access to patronage in a number of 
key areas.  Because India is predominantly an agrarian society, patronage targeted 
to rural interests was an important part of this expansion.  Varshney (1995) has 
documented the rise of rural power in the wake of the green revolution, a 
development that prevented Indira Gandhi from effectively taxing agriculturalists.  
Instead, Gandhi, no doubt motivated by a desire to preserve her popularity among 
workers in India’s enormous agrarian sector, extended rural credit and generated 
subsidies that benefited farmers.43 
My focus here, however, is on the massive sources of patronage generated 
by India’s strategy of import substitution industrialization.  Prominent among 
these were import licensing and tariffs, industrial licensing, and federal financial 
allocations.  More specifically, Gandhi tightened trade protection, import 
licensing, and industrial licensing while bringing new sources of finance under the 
government’s direct control.  Further, she made each of these seemingly 
                                                 
40 See Kochanek 1974; Sengupta 1995; Weiner 1989; Rudolph and Rudolph 1987. 
41 Interview with an Indian government official, New Delhi, October 2003. 
42 See Bardhan 1984; Chhibber 1999. 
43 Varshney 1995.  Frankel 1978 notes that this new attention to rural areas was 
hardly sufficient to put a dent in the poverty pervasive in India’s countryside.  
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 independent policy adjustments either immediately before or immediately after 
the Congress split, at a time when the party’s electorate linkages had become 
increasingly unstable.  In the sections that follow, I argue that her motivation for 
these policy shifts was to acquire the means to shore-up her shallow support in the 
electorate. 
 
Import Licensing and Tariffs 
 
High levels of trade protection were fundamental to the operation of Nehru’s 
strategy of import substitution industrialization.  Extensive trade controls were 
obviously required if Indian products were to substitute for imports, spurring 
domestic industrial production.  Without high barriers to imports, the proponents 
of ISI believed, foreign products would smother Indian infant industries before 
they had a chance to compete.   
Further, high levels of trade protection were necessary to conserve foreign 
exchange.  Because the strategy of ISI endorsed by the plans discouraged exports, 
India was severely starved for foreign currency.44  High levels of trade protection 
were therefore imposed to ensure that the country imported only the commodities 
and inputs most vital to the success of the plans.  In order to erect a high barrier 
against imports, Nehru’s government used both tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions, introducing a complex import licensing system to determine what 
commodities could be brought into the country.   
Soon after taking the reigns of government in 1966, however, Indira 
Gandhi devalued the rupee and liberalized India’s trade policy in response to a 
severe balance of payments crisis.  To her chagrin, these reforms aroused great 
opposition domestically and contributed to her party’s poor performance in the 
1967 elections.  With the stability of its electorate linkages already in decline, the 
Congress Party simply was not able to absorb the short-term impact of liberal 
economic reform.  Consequently, just as the Congress Party’s electorate linkages 
were destabilizing at the end of the 1960s (due to social changes and the party 
split), Gandhi restored India’s stringent import licensing, raised tariffs, and 
reintroduced export subsidies.45  Indeed, the Indian economy was even more 
closed under Indira Gandhi than it had been under her father. 
The restoration of strict import controls provided Gandhi with a key 
source of patronage to help shore up her shallow voting coalition, and she soon 
                                                 
44 Interview with Indian economist, New Delhi, October 2003. 
45 Interview with a Congress Party official, New Delhi, October 2003.  For 
information on India’s trade policy during this period, see also Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan 1975; Joshi and Little 1994; Agrawal et al. 2000. 
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 distributed licenses and export subsidies to benefit friends and punish enemies.46  
This motivation for expanding state intervention in trade is demonstrated by the 
nature of the trade policy reforms.  Gandhi increased the number of tariff 
exemptions available to businesses, a change that allowed her to “cherry-pick” the 
importing firms that would receive her largess.  Her power was not, therefore, 
restricted by the need to apply preset tariff lines to specific categories of 
commodities.  Very likely, the prime minister used this new power to build 
political support.47 
Indira Gandhi’s political dependence on trade protection was further 
revealed by her reaction to India’s 1973 balance of payments crisis.  Unlike in 
1966, the prime minister did not even attempt liberalization; instead, she 
introduced more stringent controls from the outset.48  While adopting firm 
measures against inflation, she increased the complexity of India’s import 
licensing clearance process and further escalated tariffs.  The prime minister’s 
precarious hold on power depended on populism and socialist rhetoric, making 
her unwilling to risk a repeat of her experience in 1966.  The instability of her 
party’s linkages to the electorate, I argue, prevented her from adopting any policy 
that might have created major short-term voter opposition. 
 
Industrial Licensing 
 
The industrial licensing process was another important component of India’s 
economic policy, determining which firms and regions would reap the benefits of 
import substitution.  An industrial license granted a firm the right to operate in 
industries made lucrative by high barriers to trade. 
Industrial licensing in India has its roots in the Industrial Policy 
Resolution of 1948.  This resolution, as amended in 1956, divided India’s 
industries into three categories: 
 
In the first category will be industries the future development of which 
will be the exclusive responsibility of the State.  The second category will 
consist of industries . . . in which private enterprise will be expected to 
supplement the effort of the State.  The third category will include all the 
                                                 
46Interview with an Indian government official, New Delhi, October 2003; 
Sengupta 1995. 
47 Interviews with two Indian officials, New Delhi, October 2003. 
48 For more on the crisis, see Joshi and Little 1994; Srinivasan 1992; Mukherji 
2000. 
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 remaining industries, and their future development will, in general, be left 
to the initiative and enterprise of the private sector.49 
 
This approach was incorporated into the industrial policy of the five-year plans 
and implemented under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act of 
1951, which required Indian businesses to seek a license before establishing new 
undertakings or significantly expanding old ones.  Through this mechanism, the 
Indian government acquired the power to direct the country’s means of 
production towards prioritized economic undertakings. 
As in trade policy, Prime Minister Gandhi began a policy of tightening 
this already restrictive industrial licensing system as the 1960s were drawing to a 
close.  The prime minister based her expanded licensing powers on a new law, the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act of 1969.  With this new 
act, she gained additional powers over which firms would enjoy the benefits of 
import substitution, powers that she used to protect her position in the face of 
shallow electoral support. 
By the mid-1960s, government studies had made it clear that industrial 
licensing, which was intended in part to encourage the growth of small firms, had 
in fact allowed larger enterprises to force them out of the market.50  As the Fourth 
Five Year Plan put the problem: 
 
The largest corporate groups are the most advantageously placed to seek 
and obtain foreign collaboration and to expand or to initiate a number of 
large and new activities. . . .  In the process there is inevitably an increase 
in the concentration of economic power.51 
 
In 1967, ostensibly reacting to this unintended consequence of licensing, Gandhi 
and her party introduced the MRTP Act in parliament.  Under the new bill, small 
and medium enterprises would be freed from the need to obtain a license for 
industrial projects that cost less than Rs1 crore.52  By contrast, India’s largest 
business houses would always need to seek government approval to establish or 
expand their factories.  Further, the major houses would be forced to direct their 
energies toward industries requiring massive investment, generally of more than 
Rs5 crores.  Any sizable federal loans received by these big business houses 
                                                 
49 Industrial Policy Resolution, 1956, in Planning Commission 1956, pp. 45-46. 
50 Sudhanshu 1986; Kochanek 1974; Stone 1994. 
51 Planning Commission 1970, pp. 14-15. 
52 A crore is an Indian measure equivalent to 10 million. 
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 would also allow the government to convert its investment into equity, 
introducing the potential for partial government ownership over the new project.53 
Needless to say, the major business associations adamantly opposed the 
new law, seeing in it a risk to their future existence.  The Associated Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (ASSOCHAM), when asked for its views by the 
government, 
 
. . . expressed apprehension that, if implemented in its present form, the 
Bill could have very far reaching and unforeseen effect which could be 
gravely deleterious to the future economic development of the country.54 
 
Despite the objections of large businesses, parliament passed the MRTP Act in 
1969, and it entered into force in 1970. 
 The same year that the MRTP Act went into effect, Indira Gandhi decided 
to require government approval for major expansions in every industrial sector.55  
She therefore revoked all forty-one license exemptions then in place.  Further, 
through revised industrial policies introduced in 1970 and 1973, as well as 
through the Foreign Exchange Regulation and Control Act of 1973, the prime 
minister continued to expand her government’s tight regulation of the economy.56 
 It is interesting to note that Gandhi’s new industrial licensing policy began 
in 1969-70, during and immediately after the Congress Split.  Nitish Sengupta, a 
deputy secretary charged with implementing the MRTP Act, put it this way: 
 
. . . it was really during the years of the late 1960s and early 1970s that the 
central government took upon itself the vast powers of intervention and 
regulation. . . .  The central government came to occupy a decisive role in 
relation to the country’s industrial and industry-related developments.57 
 
As the theory would expect, the timing of Gandhi’s new policies 
corresponded perfectly with her loss of the Congress Party organization and her 
need to rely on shallow, populist support.  The prime minister’s new powers over 
industrial licensing formed one of her most important sources of patronage, 
allowing her to reward friends and to punish enemies.58  Through industrial 
licensing, Gandhi was able to harness the financial power of the private sector to 
                                                 
53 Kochanek 1974; Frankel 1978; Sudhanshu 1986. 
54 Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry 1969. 
55 Frankel 1978. 
56 Sengupta 1995. 
57 Sengupta 1995. 
58 See Stone 1994; Sengupta 1995; Bardhan 1984; Chibber 2003. 
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 aid her in sustaining her precarious voting base.  For example, in one case, 
Gujarati oil barons funded the Congress Party’s 1974 election campaign in Uttar 
Pradesh in exchange for industrial deregulation.59  Similarly, a 1988 government 
study (published when Rajiv Gandhi, who adopted much of his mother’s 
approach, was prime minister) found that the government had used industrial 
licenses to dissuade private industry from investing in non-Congress states.60 
  
The Allocation of Government Finance 
 
To shore up her unstable voter support, Gandhi also made strategic use of at least 
two important sources of government finance: the Planning Commission and the 
nationalized commercial banks.  The money allocated through these government 
bodies was used for a variety of purposes, including the establishment and 
expansion of protected industries.  The prime minister was able to use these 
outlays as a source of patronage to build her support base among both state 
governments and private actors. 
Immediately before the Congress split, Gandhi moved to consolidate her 
control over India’s credit markets.  In July 1969, as part of her ongoing struggle 
with the Syndicate, the prime minister nationalized the country’s fourteen largest 
commercial banks.  In doing so, she extended an unprecedented level of 
government control over the distribution of investment in India, gaining for 
herself a powerful new source of patronage just as her party’s linkages with the 
electorate were destabilizing. 
Indira Gandhi’s decision to nationalize the banks, a possibility that had 
long been debated in the Congress, was first and foremost an effort by the prime 
minister to strengthen her socialist credentials vis-à-vis the Syndicate.61  Finance 
Minister Morarji Desai, a vocal opponent of nationalization, had previously 
elicited an agreement within the government and the CWC to try bank regulation 
first.  When the prime minister decided to move ahead with nationalization, she 
first removed Desai from the finance portfolio, taking the job for herself.  I. G. 
Patel, a secretary in the finance ministry, has described what happened next: 
 
Without any fanfare, she [Indira Gandhi] asked me whether banking was 
under my charge.  On telling her it was, she simply said:  ‘For political 
reasons, it has been decided to nationalize the banks.  You have to prepare 
within 24 hours the bill, a note for the Cabinet and a speech for me to the 
nation on the radio tomorrow evening.  Can you do it and make sure there 
                                                 
59 Frankel 1978. 
60 Chhibber 1999. 
61 Frankel 1978; Patel 2002. 
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 is no leak?’  There was no pretence that this was not a political decision, 
and the message was clear that no argument from me was required.62 
 
The prime minister wanted nationalization to come as a surprise for 
maximum political effect, and she decided to implement it through Presidential 
decree rather than to wait for the slow legislative process.  This approach had the 
added benefit of implying to the public that bank nationalization had been 
effected solely on the initiative of the prime minister and over the objections of 
the Syndicate.63  Gandhi’s decision was greeted with jubilation by the Indian 
masses and indeed by many members of the Congress Party.  It played an 
important role in hastening the split and, very likely, in creating the progressive 
image that the prime minister exploited so effectively in the 1971 election. 
The nationalized banks served as sources of credit for a wide variety of 
protected economic ventures across India, providing Gandhi with tremendous 
leverage over India’s private sector.  Her leverage was further increased by the 
banks’ insertion of clauses into certain loan contracts allowing the government to 
convert its investment into equity.  Table 2, which shows the per capita flow of 
bank loans and other federal institutional funds to projects within each state, 
provides a sense of the scale of investment resources now under the prime 
minister’s control.  Departing from the practice of other countries with 
nationalized credit systems, Prime Minister Gandhi extended direct political 
control over loan distribution, appointing allies to the boards of nationalized 
banks.  India’s credit system became increasing politicized, loans were awarded 
based on non-market criteria, and defaults mounted.64  Corruption ran rampant 
among loan officers and loan applicants, as schemes multiplied to take advantage 
of the arbitrary rules governing access to credit.65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 Patel 2002, p. 135. 
63 Frankel 1978. 
64 Interview with an Indian government official, New Delhi, October 2003; 
Bardhan 1984. 
65 Sengupta 1995; Bardhan 1984. 
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 Table 2:    
Per Capita Flow of Federal Institutional Funds to Projects 
Within Each Indian State, 1973-80 (rupees) 
 
States 
 
 
 
Nationalized 
Commercial 
Banks 
 
 
Development 
Banks 
 
 
Agriculture 
Refinance and 
Development 
Corporation 
 
Andhra Pradesh 243 59 45 
Assam 132 35 6 
Gujarat 392 219 27 
Bihar 109 23 20 
Kerala 385 67 14 
Madhya Pradesh 138 26 32 
Maharashtra 667 131 30 
Karnataka 349 122 35 
Orissa 120 31 18 
Punjab 776 78 87 
Haryana 520 113 123 
Rajasthan 219 60 26 
Tamil Nadu 365 97 19 
Uttar Pradesh 149 37 28 
West Bengal 370 70 9 
Himachal 
Pradesh 205 58 8 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 237 77 1 
Manipur 141 5 8 
Meghalaya 182 86 0 
Nagaland 364 35 4 
Tripura 149 17 2 
    
Source:  Thimmaiah 1985   
 
Further, the evidence indicates that Gandhi used central outlays under the 
Fourth Five Year Plan to build political support, although she broadly retained 
prior constraints on the central government’s ability to determine the allocation of 
funds.  In 1967, when Morarji Desai appointed D. R. Gadgil as deputy chair of the 
Planning Commission, the Congress Party was still broadly decentralized.  The 
new deputy chair backed a systematic approach to central plan outlays, and his 
efforts combined with the demands of powerful state chief ministers to produce 
the Gadgil formula.  This formula based central outlays on the population of 
states, their income, their tax gathering efforts, their outstanding projects, and 
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 their special needs.  It granted the states federal finance in the form of block 
grants that could be spent largely at their discretion.  The introduction of the 
Gadgil formula completed the process of devolving planning power from the 
Centre to the states that Shastri had begun in 1964.66 
It appears that Gandhi preserved this structured system while exploiting 
the Gadgil Formula’s ambiguities to transform plan outlays into a form of 
patronage.  Even under the formula, the central government could determine at 
least 20% of transfers with considerable discretion.67  Which of the states 
harbored “special problems” that required central funding?  Which states had 
“special needs” arising from infrastructure investment?  It was up to the Planning 
Commission, the government, and ultimately the prime minister to say.  Further, 
Gandhi and her government had more direct control over certain plan outlays that 
did not fall under the Gadgil formula.  As a result, there was still considerable 
room for plan transfers to be used to build the prime minister’s political strength.   
 
Figure 1: 
 
 
  
                                                 
66 Frankel 1978. 
67 George 1985. 
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  Can the relative distribution of patronage during Indira Gandhi’s tenure 
provide any evidence for the role of political considerations in India’s economic 
behavior?  Figure 1 shows the state-level allocation of industrial licenses and plan 
finance during her time as prime minister.  The data indicate that Gandhi focused 
India’s patronage on states providing her party with marginal electoral support, 
allocating fewer government benefits to states giving the Congress either very 
weak or very strong support.  This targeting of patronage, which I analyze more 
closely in Hankla (2006), provides evidence that electoral politics was important 
in the distribution of economic benefits during the Indira Gandhi years. 
 
Concluding Observations: Patronage or Ideology? 
 
As a means of summarizing my argument, I want to revisit a question that I posed 
at the beginning of the paper.  Is it possible that ideology could have driven Indira 
Gandhi’s decision to increase the state’s role in the Indian economy?  After all, 
India’s development approach since the days of Nehru had been a socialist one, 
dependent on a powerful government to promote industrialization and economic 
independence.  Indeed, the Nehru period had been characterized by significant 
state intervention in the economy (although not generally as much as during the 
period 1969-74).  Perhaps Prime Minister Gandhi’s economic policy was merely 
the culmination of India’s socialist development strategy? 
 I argue here that, for two primary reasons, Gandhi’s economic policy 
decisions are better explained by her need to develop new sources of patronage to 
stabilize her electorate linkages than by any socialist ideology.  The first of these 
reasons relates to the timing of the prime minister’s economic initiatives.  When 
Gandhi took up the mantle of prime minister in 1966, she instituted liberal 
reforms, devaluing India’s currency and reducing trade barriers.  The growth of 
Gandhi’s socialist rhetoric, as well as her decision to accelerate the state’s 
economic role, corresponded perfectly with the destabilization of her party’s 
electorate linkages.  The prime minister accelerated her shift towards socialism in 
1967, when the Congress Party’s poor performance indicated that the stable 
electorate linkages and aggregative structure of the Congress system was in 
decline.  Further, Gandhi’s key initiatives of bank nationalization and the MRTP 
Act came to fruition in the same year (1969) that the Congress split deprived the 
prime minister of the party’s local organizations.  To say the least, the timing 
indicates that Gandhi’s new economic policies were, at least in part, a response to 
the emerging political situation. 
The very nature of Prime Minster Gandhi’s economic intervention 
provides a second reason to interpret her policies as tools to build political 
support.  Much of the evidence to support this contention is provided in the prior 
section’s analysis of trade, industrial, and fiscal policy.  Prime Minister Gandhi 
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 centralized control over each of these economic policy areas, providing herself an 
opportunity to use the state’s economic influence politically.68  For example, as I 
have already noted, she changed India’s trade policy to allow the cherry-picking 
of individual firms for support, and she assigned political supporters to the boards 
of nationalized banks.   
Therefore, while it is difficult to prove the motivations of political actors, 
there is significant evidence that Indira Gandhi made use of trade and economic 
benefits, whether in the form of fiscal transfers, industrial licenses, or trade 
concessions, to build and maintain her political support.  The instability of her 
party’s linkages to the electorate, a result of both the Congress split and more 
fundamental social changes, necessitated the prime minister’s use of patronage to 
stay in office.  Having centralized the Congress Party under her personal 
leadership, Gandhi and her associates managed India’s patronage networks 
personally, targeting largess for the maximum political benefit.  This system, with 
a few changes, remained largely in place through the 1970s and 1980, and, 
according to many observers, significantly slowed India’s potential economic 
growth.69 
Are unstable electorate linkages still encouraging significant state 
intervention in India’s economy today?  Answering this question is complicated 
by the recent proliferation of regional parties in the Lok Sabha and the 
corresponding explosion in the size of India’s governing coalitions.  It is more 
difficult to trace the political motivations for patronage distribution when the 
interests of numerous parties must be considered, especially when some parties 
(such as the BJP) may enjoy more stable electorate linkages than others (such as 
the Congress).  Nevertheless, there is preliminary evidence that unstable linkages 
still play a role in motivating the government’s economic role.  Despite the 
dramatic economic liberalization of 1991, subsidies and other politically sensitive 
forms of patronage have yet to be eliminated.  Indeed, a recent study estimated 
that central government subsidies in 1998-99 amounted to 4.59% of India’s 
GDP.70  While some of these subsidies were undoubtedly used to achieve socially 
desirable goals, financial resources almost certainly remain a useful political tool 
for India’s governing elite.71  Moreover, the elimination of these government 
controlled resources would surely be a dangerous strategy for any party lacking 
stable electoral support. 
                                                 
68 Numerous scholars have noted Gandhi’s centralization of power.  Among the 
most notable are Kochanek 1976 and Kohli 1990. 
69 For example, Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1975. 
70 Srivastava et al. 2003. 
71 Among the desirable social goals is the elimination of rural poverty.  See 
Sengupta 2006. 
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  The Indian experience highlighted in this article suggests, I believe, that 
the linkage stability of governing parties can be an important determinant of 
economic policy outcomes in democracies.  Political party leaders who must 
concern themselves with the short-run survival of their parties may be tempted to 
use patronage to shore-up their shallow electorate support.  The time horizons of 
these leaders are often short, reducing their concern for the future economic 
impact of policies that increase government access to patronage.  Future studies 
will hopefully map out the party linkage-economic policy nexus in other cases, 
providing a fuller and more nuanced understanding of this important relationship. 
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